ABSTRACT
INTRODUCTION
Understanding the relationship between globalization and law requires analysis of the interactions of markets and law at all levels, domestic and international, as well as diverse processes of norm creation, enforcement, and adjudication by state and nonstate actors alike. Complex sociopolitical interrelationships and interlegalities result from these interactions. Domestic law is one effect of globalization, and conversely, our conceptions of globalization are also (in part) effects of domestic law. 1 This article will focus on these recursive effects through a case study involving the interplay of domestic law in relation to the denationalizing forces of globalization in the highly domestic context of social services.
Understanding the role of domestic law in the current global environment involves two main perspectives. The first is a domestic perspective on globalization, so as to appreciate the extent to which globalization is produced and experienced in highly diverse ways in different times, places, and circumstances. Taking a domestic perspective on globalization reminds us that globalization is neither uniform nor somehow "above" society and its institutions; it does not erase or mitigate the specificity of local contexts and concerns. Thus, globalization enlarges the scope for comparison at the same time that it requires us to take into account the specifics of localized differences, as these are also meaningful.
The second perspective is closely related to the first: understanding domestic law's role today also means taking a global perspective on domestic affairs. This goes beyond the interplay of the local and translocal just described. "Global forces" are not only or wholly the effects of extraterritorial or translocal (transnational) phenomena. They do not necessarily come from beyond national borders or beyond national governments. On the contrary, globalization is deeply embedded within domestic institutions and their participants-both public and private-as ideas, relations, interests, and effects. This situation poses both opportunities and constraints on the relevance of law and the potential for law reform, especially as affecting vulnerable populations. As we shall see, globalization is not just a top down affair.
I. DOUBLE PERSPECTIVES ON THE MARKETIZATION OF SOCIAL SERVICES
To illustrate the importance of these perspectives to discussions of law reform, this article will focus primarily on the privatization of welfare administration through one "extended case" involving the state of Indiana. 2 I chose this case because it illustrates so vividly both perspectives described above as well as the potential for law reform arising from what Karl Polanyi calls "the double movement" between the state and the market. 3 In his classic book, The Great Transformation, Polanyi argues that the self-regulating market is a utopian myth that tends to normalize the dominance of market forces. 4 To this we might add the observation that the myth of the self-regulating market tends to limit the political questions in marketization to the value of efficiency. This was the case for certain categories of vulnerable populations in the United States. The emphasis on costs and efficiency in the context of privatized welfare services, privatized prisons, and the administration of unregistered immigrants obviates, to a great degree, many of the political, social, and ethical issues that these social contexts might otherwise involve. 5 This situation might, at least theoretically, in Polanyi's terms, trigger what he refers to as a "double movement"-a sharp political reaction in the form of new demands upon the state on behalf of those whose issues go beyond efficiency and cost; 6 however, in the United States, these groups have so little political power that their needs do not usually rise to the level of a public contest. Indeed, the existence of persistent poverty is often assumed to be a function of the global marketplace working normallyi.e. efficiently, with maximum reduction of fixed cost points. A marketbased model of globalization underlies these domestic reforms.
Polanyi anticipates that marketization would produce political conditions that would result in the reversal of the processes that (in his term) "dis-embed" the state from the market. 7 The case this article explores shows that re-embedding the state is not a simple question of reversing decisions taken, but rather a complex sequencing of political and legal engagements. We shall return to Polanyi later in the discussion. 8 As background to the case, I note that in the United States, the marketization of social services became politically popular as electorates became newly aware of global economic competition in the 1980s and 1990s, resulting in a major transformation in both the idea of "the public" and the way the public sector functions in American life. 9 Understanding the domestic faces of globalization-represented in this article primarily by welfare recipients-requires both of these perspectives. But welfare is not the only context that is instructive in this regard. Immigration and privatized prisons offer other relevant cases (though beyond the scope of this article). For example, in the context of immigration, a global perspective on domestic affairs draws our attention to the factors affecting migrants' choices regarding destination, the decision to migrate in the first place, and the question of admission to the new host country. But it does not stop there. A domestic perspective on globalization reminds us that admission is not the same as inclusion. In the United States, some of the problems facing immigrants are also the problems of the working poor and other populations at the social margins who are particularly affected by reductions in social services. 10 Thus, welfare eligibility in many states increasingly depends upon judgments rendered by private companies. 11 Prisoners held in privately managed facilities are also subject to companies' business interests and their need to satisfy their shareholders. 12 Political debates that connect globalization to government regulation, especially outsourcing and privatization, usually treat globalization as if it were synonymous with the market, often politically packaged with (or as) ideological assertions about the virtues of markets over bureaucracy. The issue of immigration is intertwined with these premises in several ways. The regulation of immigration tends to privilege work, particularly skilled work; under other circumstances, the argument against migration is waged on the grounds of unfair (i.e., under-selling) competition for jobs with the native born. Immigration policy sets heavy bars against migrants who might require government-subsidized social services. 13 These are essentially efficiency arguments entirely consistent with marketized eds., 2009) (describing the shift of federal and state government to work with private organizations since the New Deal era); DAVID HARVEY, THE ENIGMA OF CAPITAL AND THE CRISES OF CAPITALISM (2010 approaches to other areas of social policy. But immigration also challenges those approaches. Anti-immigration critics blame immigrants for restricting the work opportunities of the native born, but not the policies that produce job scarcity. They blame immigrants for working, but also for not working. A similar story can be told for prisoners, especially those held in private prisons. 14 A domestic perspective on globalization shows states eager to compete in the global economy by attracting new investment and jobs to their jurisdictions. To engage in this competition, they often use as their political currency the promise of low taxes, a skilled workforce, and low regulatory costs-including off-loading the costs of maintaining and managing prisons. 15 Such global aspirations have coincided with an explosion of population growth in prisons due largely to drug laws and approaches to punishment embodied by so-called three strike laws. 16 One way to build new prisons and not raise taxes is to outsource the construction and management of these prisons to private firms. 17 Private firms pay the upfront construction costs and amortize them over a number of years; new prisons can be built without significantly affecting state taxes or budgets. 18 Private firms usually cut 16. See HARCOURT, supra note 14, at 202. These and other approaches have led to an explosion of prison populations around the U. S. and various new means for managing these prisoners as well as building and financing the new prisons now required to hold them. See id. at 196-208. Indeed, as Bernard Harcourt has pointed out, "In 2008, the United States . . . incarcerated more than one percent of its adult population-the highest rate in the world, five times the rate in England and twelve times the rate in Japan, and the highest raw number in the world as well." Id. at 198. And more than 10% of African American men between the ages of 20-34 were behind bars. costs in other ways, as well-for example, by employing nonunion guards, who are paid nonunion wages and hired in lower numbers. 19 A global perspective on domestic law shows that the firms to which this work is outsourced are, in most instances, multinational corporations that operate private prisons around the world. 20 Moreover, though the theory behind outsourcing is that a state can thereby take advantage of market competition and get the best price, there are often only a few firms that regularly compete for such contracts, dominating the field. 21 A kind of delegation occurs not just to the private sector generally, but more specifically to a handful of firms. A global perspective reveals that outsourcing often means trading a government monopoly for a private one or at least a private oligopoly. The expertise that these firms develop internationally in such public-private management arrangements can create its own pressures for privatization at the international level. 22 Welfare policy also involves parallels to the economic logic behind privatized prisons as well as to immigration, referenced above. At the federal level, for example, the Welfare Reform Act of 1996 eliminated welfare assistance to immigrants; 23 amounted to a significant portion of the cost savings usually attributed to that Act. 24 These and other market driven reforms are in many ways a response to a particular conception of globalization as economic pressure resulting from global economic competition. 25 They are in part attempts by states to be as competitive as possible in their drive to attract new capital to their state as well as retain the investments already there. The reforms are also the culmination of experiments occurring throughout the country, experiments that place more and more faith in markets and private providers than in traditional public sector employees and facilities. 26 Privatization of social services, which in this context means the outsourcing of the administration of social services to private entities, is the primary zone where we can expect to find an active exchange between global and domestic perspectives. Specifically, the new relationships between private and public actors created by the marketization of borders, prisons, and welfare, teach us important lessons about the domestic fronts of globalization and-in that lightwe may see the potential for new kinds of law reform that can correct the limitations of a binary conception of government and markets as if these were mutually exclusive. A role for law reform exists, particularly law reform that can help create new forums for deliberation and stakeholder participation when it comes to decisions regarding whether and how to outsource. Creating new opportunities for political participation would be in keeping with the idea of Polanyi's "double movement." 27 Looking ahead to those future developments, it bears noting that there are other models of globalization beyond the neoliberal one that predominates today. 28 If we are, in Polanyi's terms, to re-embed these market means into society, law has an important role to play in creating 24 opportunities for stakeholders to go beyond narrow cost questions and to pragmatically and flexibly experiment with approaches that offer fresh solutions to the need for efficient and fair outcomes. Law can provide the mechanisms and the forums for working out the negotiation of public and private interests in the political arena. 29 Understanding how market means affect the substantive provisions of the programs they are designed to deliver requires a different way of thinking about globalization. In relation to social services, it requires a translation and an appreciation of the actual effects of the market in action on the substantive goals of the social services program involved. 30 (2005) . The "New Legal Realism" is an emerging approach to law that attempts to incorporate interdisciplinary studies and empirical analysis into legal policy considerations. As Professor Erlanger states, "[l]ike the original Realists, who also sought to use social science in service of advancing legal knowledge, new legal realist scholars bring together legal theory and empirical research to build a stronger foundation for understanding law and formulating legal policy." Id. at 337. The New Legal Realists emphasize a "Bottom-Up" approach to empirical study:
The concept of "bottom-up" legal scholarship captures a combination of important aspects of NLR's [New Legal Realism] approach to research. First, at a methodological level, a bottom-up approach requires that assertions about the impact of law be supported by research at the "ground" level. This in turn requires that we rely on (or actually undertake ourselves) empirical research rather than using projections based simply on our theories or individual experiences. A bottom-up approach takes an expansive and open-minded view of the impact of law, and also includes within its purview a wide range of socio-economic classes and interests. Indeed, at times, this approach will reach outside of the boundaries of formal legal processes and institutions altogether to examine other forms of regulation and ordering. In order to do this, researchers will need to use empirical tools to help them move beyond formal categories, and they will have to remain skeptical about the impact of formal law. All of these admonitions can be understood simply as tenets of doing good social science research, because they seek to limit the degree to which unexamined assumptions made by researchers wind up blinding them to important parts of the picture they are studying. Realism and offering a cautious assessment and general qualification: "[l]egal academics and the lawyers they train must often make normative evaluations of legal rules and institutions on the basis of only partial information. They ought to do so with full awareness of the limitations of their analyses . . . . The New Legal Realism remains in its infancy. As it grows, we will learn much more.").
example, the modernization of welfare eligibility is all about improving the access of potential welfare recipients to benefits, have these reforms in fact worked the way they were intended? 31 But perhaps even more fundamentally, the marketization of programs designed to serve vulnerable populations makes highly visible the line between law and society, between the public and private sectors, and between the federal and local government. The situation of welfare recipients is shaped at the crux of a number of issues central to the domestic face of globalization: the limits of the market (including markets for labor), the limits of law, and the limits of power at the various social and political levels of government and governance. Marketized social programs also make more visible new forms of identity, social mobility, and vulnerability, as the politics of globalization take shape around and through them.
This article will look at privatized social services primarily from the standpoint of finding new ways of understanding the role law can play to re-embed marketized administrative approaches into the public sector. The administration of these government services and duties does not involve complete deregulation; therefore, these processes do not totally separate the state from the market. 32 New relationships are forged; new mixes of public and private power are created. By understanding the interactions involved in the privatization of domestic social services more fully, we can suggest law reforms that can re-embed the market into the state in new and effective ways. As we shall see, this means rethinking the status of the service recipient-whom privatization tends to rewrite as a product rather than a client or stakeholder. This is a serious limitation, as the case study will show. Finding new possibilities for marketized public-private relationships is essential for re-embodying service recipients as citizens in the full sense of the term-i. In Part II, a discussion of welfare reform prefaces the Indiana case study. In the case study, I examine further not only the use of market concepts and processes to carry out what were previously governmental tasks, but also the areas where the translation of business approaches into governmental actions broke down-places where market approaches to welfare applications did not or could not adequately translate fully into the governmental tasks at hand. The attempts at modernizing welfare administration in Indiana have relied heavily on the efficiencies a private corporation could bring to welfare eligibility decisions. There was, at least initially, a binary assumption built into these modernization reforms. Market techniques and private providers were to replace traditional government approaches that relied on face-to-face contact by government employees. Government modernization of benefits was to occur by outsourcing the administration of the welfare program to a private entity rather than insourcing modernization techniques into the government offices in question.
With such binary thinking came the expectation that the private sector would be, for the most part, automatically better than the government itself at developing these new approaches. 34 The market-government binary that seemed very much to shape the early thinking of how welfare could be modernized presumptively favored not only new technological approaches, but also a conception of the task at hand that treated welfare applicants as essentially a reasonably homogeneous population of customers who could now fend for themselves more easily with computer access and 800 numbers. As we shall see, however, such a characterization can all too easily depoliticize many of the highly individualized, personal issues involved that require more than an abstract concern with access, while at the same time adding an aura of objectivity to the outcomes achieved. More important, as this case will also show, the state of Indiana was IBM's client and, though the burdens of this contract were felt acutely by welfare recipients, only Indiana could challenge IBM's performance of the contract, which it ultimately did when it sued for breach of contract. Welfare applicants and recipients, however, had to work through the 34. The government's contract did in theory reserve final decision-making to the government and it did retain field offices in all ninety-two counties. state rather than protecting their rights as third-party beneficiaries of this contract. To this extent, they were really neither clients nor even customers, but the presumed recipients of an abstract product called access. Even more important, the ability of welfare recipients to access their benefits in a more efficient way was a form of wealth creation for the state, allowing it to lower its costs and labor force. In reality, however, these new forms of access were not successful in many cases. The more the method of delivery of these services became disconnected from outcomes in actual cases, the less such a contract could serve the very population for which it was intended.
Welfare applicants, however, were neither customers nor IBM's products. And legally speaking they were not clients either-they had no independent rights under the contract as third-party beneficiaries. 35 They were, of course, citizens in dire economic need. They were a diverse group, consisting of the elderly, disabled, children, single parents, and individuals for whom a job may not have been available due to their skill set or the relatively depressed state of the economy. Moreover, given the fact that this case involves individuals at the bottom of the economic and often educational ladder as well, the digital divide when it comes to computer access and know-how can be quite pronounced. 36 Carried too far, a primarily technological approach to welfare eligibility makes technology itself a filter-since many potential recipients may not have access to computers or even telephone call centers. 37 These circumstances risk substituting technological, cost efficient means for substantive benefits. As Professor Ronen Shamir has written in his critique of corporate social responsibility, we need a theory of translation when we apply neoliberal reform to traditional forms of government regulation. "Such a theory must come to grips with, and identify the pitfalls of, working within the non-governmental organization institutional paradigm, because the latter is heavily biased 35 Welfare modernization in Indiana illustrates the problems Shamir identifies. As originally conceptualized and proposed, the welfare reforms focused primarily on cost savings made possible by technologically sophisticated means for assessing welfare eligibility, rather than, quite literally, focusing on the welfare of the individuals involved. 40 The elimination of perceived corruption in the welfare eligibility process was also a goal of modernization. 41 Reliance on market actors and the best business practices they could implement meant that face-to-face contact with government caseworkers in repeat situations would be drastically reduced. The reasoning behind making the new system relatively impersonal and decentralized was that the system was likely to become more objective. 42 Caseworkers were assumed to be prone to favor applicants and override eligibility criteria at their own discretion. Critics of the existing system also argued that the face-to-face system was susceptible to mistakes and fraud. Moreover they believed that the move to private providers would significantly decrease the number of government employees on the state's payroll. As we shall see, most welfare caseworkers became employees of the companies to which the welfare program was outsourced. 43 In short, the main goals of Indiana's modernization approach were to increase access for welfare applicants through computers and call centers, and in the process lower the number of government workers involved by moving public employees to the private payrolls of the private corporations with whom the government contracted. This lowered the costs of administering the welfare program, while presumably increasing the accuracy of the decisions made and eliminating much of the fraud that had previously occurred. Market perspectives and best practices approaches, especially computer access and telephone call centers, privately run, would now substitute for most of the face-to-face casework that had previously typified the now discredited welfare eligibility approaches used by Indiana in the past. This is where the outsourcing process began. What is remarkable about the evolution of welfare modernization in Indiana, however, is that various forms of what Polanyi might identify as the double movement in action helped refocus welfare modernization on substantive outcomes and less on new, efficient ways of servicing the "customers" involved. Unforeseen events also intervened, including the massive flooding in parts of Indiana in 2007 and the Great Recession of 2008. In the final analysis, however, the state may initially have embraced the binary view that markets and market approaches are superior to government when it came to administering welfare at the state level, but ultimately the state backed away from so binary a view, seeking instead to devise and implement what it called a more hybrid approach to the administration of welfare benefits. 44 The Indiana case is interesting in part because the state itself ultimately took some corrective action when it became clear the contract to which it entered was not working the way it had hoped 45 -a double movement of sorts. 46 Moreover, from the time this approach was suggested political pushback, in the form of legislation, began. 47 46. See POLANYI, supra note 3, at 79-80 (referring to the social history in the nineteenth century as a "double movement").
47. From 2006 to 2009, the Indiana legislature introduced a plethora of bills addressing the privatization of government services and functions. Some of the proposals were uninspired. See S. 425, 115th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ind. 2007 ) ("A contract for services may not be entered into for a period of more than four (4) years unless a statute specifically provides otherwise."). Others sought to implement comprehensive 2007, the state even enacted a law requiring state agencies to allow for public comment and testimony at a public hearing and obtain approval from the state budget committee before it enters into a private contract lasting at least four years and worth over $10 million, and in which a private vendor provides services formerly performed by state employees. 48 The double perspective of a global view of domestic reform coupled with a domestic view of globalization helps us to understand more fully these and other details of welfare reform in Indiana. These perspectives reveal how marketized administrative approaches to welfare dis-embed the state from the market yet, in the process, create the conditions for re-embedding the state. In Indiana, as this article will detail, the re-embedding process created new relationships between citizens and government, as well as between the public and private sectors now involved in welfare administration. As a result we can better see and understand how the double movement described by Polanyi might work-but after privatization, the return movement was, perhaps surprisingly, initiated by the state. At the crux of these processes may lie the transformation of the neoliberal state and an alternative domestic approach to globalization.
II. WELFARE REFORM
The Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 ("Welfare Reform Act") 49 was passed by the United States Congress as an avowed program of economic and social change: it was all about work-"workfare not welfare" was explicitly formulated to eliminate dependency. 50 To that end, the bill mandated work. 51 The Welfare Reform Act also devolved power and responsibility to the states. Federal money was to go back to the states in the form of block grants where states could, within broad guidelines, use the money as they saw fit. 52 Experimentation was a part of the plan. 53 Some states used it to create job training programs; 54 some used it to fund programs designed to encourage character building and a deeper commitment to religious faith-so called faith-based initiatives. 55 But many states that chose to continue to provide direct payments to the poor decided to outsource these responsibilities to multinational corporations (MNCs) such as Lockheed Martin, IBM, or Maximus Corp. 56 MNCs in some states took over the responsibility of determining who should be on the welfare rolls and who should be eliminated pursuant to state contracts and state oversight. 57 A global perspective on outsourcing welfare administration reveals that, not unlike the drive to privatize prisons, the driving forces behind this shift to market actors 57. See Bezdek, supra note 54, at 1566 (2001) ("The Act now authorizes states to employ private entities to conduct intake and make eligibility determinations-traditional gate-keeping functions of any benefits program-most often identified with the legal protections developed under AFDC. Although nonprofits have been involved in service delivery for decades, the Act has brought for-profit enterprises into social services functions far beyond their prior limited roles as contractors for data systems."); Rom, supra note 56, at 171-76. in the context of welfare administration was the belief that market approaches to eligibility and the incorporation of business best practices would make states more efficient and globally competitive by lowering welfare administration costs and reducing errors and corruption. 58 A global perspective on domestic law reveals that by privatizing this aspect of welfare administration, the Welfare Reform Act also had the ironic effect of re-centralizing these decisions, not at the federal level, but at the multinational corporate level. 59 The underlying rationale was that market approaches and best business practices were the best way to reform what usually was seen as inefficient and-as we shall see in the case on Indiana-even corrupt delivery systems; 60 though what constituted corruption may have also included the exercise of discretion by individual caseworkers. 61 Also implied in such outsourcing in the welfare context was the idea that business approaches to welfare administration would help encourage individual self-sufficiency and independence.
In short, a MNC was substituted for state and federal government; uniformity was achieved, but the kind of uniformity that comes with finding an efficient way of proceeding. It was a type of uniformity that would allow citizens of the state to minimize their costs and taxes, but also enable the shareholders of the companies involved to maximize their profits. They could do this by doing what they did best: streamlining and computerizing their services. Computers and call centers replaced caseworkers. The domestic face of a welfare recipient was thus transformed from a citizen to an output or a product-one that either deserved benefits or one that did not, and, in a sense, a customer as well, in that they were to receive this information of entitlement or non-entitlement promptly and with a minimum of face-to-face contact. A domestic perspective on these global efficiency rationales, however, must begin with some skepticism. Welfare benefits have a long and complicated history, especially beginning with the turn to neoliberalism that occurred in the Reagan-Thatcher era. 63 Indeed, welfare recipients have not only been analyzed in multiple ways, 64 but ridiculed as well, with the infamous image of the so-called "welfare queen." 65 Along with recent welfare to work reforms, others increasingly have relied on the criminal law to minimize anticipated corruption. 66 Against this political backdrop, the need for welfare has been increasing. The disparity in incomes between the "haves" and "have-nots" has grown dramatically, not only in the United States, but globally as well. 67 Moreover, poverty rates have risen substantially in the United States, especially given the slow pace of economic recovery after the financial meltdown of 2008. 68 Is the modernization of welfare intended primarily to address the increasing needs of individuals in economic crisis by increasing access to the system, or is it designed primarily to lower costs, quite apart from the substantive impact the means of lowering costs might have on individual welfare applicants? To what extent do the reforms involved take into account the differences in welfare applicants, recognizing that they include the disabled, the elderly, children, and individuals with various backgrounds, not all of which are computer literate or self-sufficient when it comes to analyzing the choices they may have to make? As the Indiana case shows, a largely binary approach to market approaches as opposed to a fully government administered program ultimately evolved into a hybrid public-private partnership with some formal and informal changes in law that offer some promise for the future and the beginnings of law reforms designed to re-embed the market into the faced potential criticism for inhibiting welfare beneficiaries from moving beyond the program to self-reliance. 78 Indiana ranked last in the nation when it came to moving welfare recipients off welfare and to work as the 1996 federal law sought to do. 79 When Governor Mitch Daniels was elected in 2004, he brought a market reform perspective to many areas of state government, welfare included. 80 During his time as governor, he succeeded in privatizing various state functions, including certain functions of the prison system. He also outsourced the maintenance and operation of an Indiana toll road to a private firm. 81 Welfare reform was also on his agenda. From the early days of his administration, he became particularly concerned that Indiana's welfare system was broken and "plagued by high error rates, fraud, wasted dollars, poor conditions for its employees, and very available at http://in.gov/governorhistory/mitchdaniels/files/Performance_Report_4_(Jul-Dec_2006).pdf (report published on March 30, 2007 stating that "[i]n 2005 FSSA paid Food Stamps recipients $33.9 million more than they were entitled" because of error). However, contrary to the reported instances above, not all recipients accused of fraud in the United States are attempting to game the system. While data for Indiana is unavailable, some studies have shown that much of the rule breaking in welfare law is done unknowingly as a result of recipients' ignorance or misunderstanding of the rules involved. See, e.g., GUSTAFSON, supra note 63, at 3, 129, 161. Additionally, caseworkers in Indiana have in some instances "bent the rules" not for personal gain but because they were sympathetic to the recipient. Int'l Bus. Machs. Corp., No. 49D10-1005-PL-021451, slip op. at 32.
78. See FSSA REPORT, supra note 73, at 18. The report stated the issue as follows: As a result of the Deficit Reduction Act (DRA) of 2005, the federal government requires that states meet a workforce participation for TANF recipients of 50%. In other words, 50% of Hoosier TANF recipients must be engaged in meaningful work-related activity, either working in a job or an Indiana Manpower and Comprehensive Training (IMPACT)-sponsored activity like volunteer work. (Certain TANF recipients, such as nonparent caretakers, are exempt from this calculation.) Indiana has historically had a workforce participation rate near 33%. With Congress passing the TANF Reauthorization earlier this year, the 50% workforce participation requirement will be strictly enforced, and Indiana is at risk for failing to meet this requirement. This could cost the state up to 5% of its TANF block grant, or $10.3 million, and the federal government could require that Indiana replace these lost federal funds with state funds.
79. See id. at 4-5 ("In the past decade, Indiana ranked 50th in the percent reduction of citizens on welfare."); Int'l Bus. Machs poor service to its clients." 82 Almost as soon as he became governor, he and other state officials began developing a welfare reform plan modeled on an approach that had recently been taken in Texas and called the "remote eligibility" model. 83 The model allowed recipients to apply for public benefits through a variety of channels-by fax or mail, over the phone, through the Internet, or in person. Through one of these avenues, recipients would contact call centers, which would process all applications and renewals. Recipients could then track the progress of their applications online or through an automated phone system. 84 Governor Daniels, in accord with his overall plans for privatization in various other governmental areas, 85 apply for welfare benefits via the Internet or through call centers rather than face-to-face meetings in welfare offices. Eligibility determinations would be done on a centralized statewide basis rather than in local county offices. Best business practices would be used and this meant that, to the greatest extent possible, the elimination of office visits and face-to-face meetings with government welfare caseworkers. 86 In October 2005, FSSA issued a Request for Information (RFI), 87 which sought vendors to assist with a state program "to redesign the state's process and systems for determination of client eligibility for public assistance," a system that "should enable Indiana citizens to enroll with a minimum of personal visits." 88 The desired outcome was a "decrease in volume going through local offices." 89 By emphasizing that clients should be able to apply in person, through the Internet, over the phone, by fax, or mail, the RFI also sought to increase the self-sufficiency of applicants for social services. 90 Presumably, self-sufficiency in this context meant that they did not need anyone's face-to-face assistance to determine whether they were eligible for benefits and if so, which ones and how best to apply for them. Moreover, there was a level of computer savvy assumed that was unrealistic for this population of potential "clients." An agency may choose to research information on a proposed [Request for Proposal] (RFP) without having to commit to doing an RFP by doing a Request for Information (RFI). The RFI is used by agencies to gain information on specifications and pricing for new products, programs or services. The RFI strictly requests information and a contract will not result from the RFI. The RFI is not to be used as a tool to "pre-select" vendors. Responses to the RFI will remain confidential until after the RFP is complete. If no RFP is issued, the RFI responses become public information after the decision is made not to proceed with an RFP. IND. DEP'T. OF On January 3, 2006, "IBM and a group of [twelve] coalition companies called the 'Hoosier Coalition for Self Sufficiency' submitted a response to the RFI." 91 The largest portion of the work among the Coalition members and the largest part of the compensation was to go to Affiliated Computer Services (ACS)-a subsidiary of Xerox-which employed the personnel assisting the processing of eligibility applications. 92 The state then issued a Request for Proposal and for Best and Final Offer, at which point other participating bidders dropped out, leaving the IBM Coalition as the only potential contract partner. 93 "Having concluded that the state itself could not modernize its system on its own without the assistance of an independent vendor, on May 11, 2006, [Indiana] announced its intention to award the eligibility modernization contract to the IBM Coalition." 94 This approach is what the Family and Social Services Administration recommended in its 2006 report, Eligibility Modernization: The Need for Change. 95 The FSSA report described to the Governor what he seemed already to have anticipated: "terrible customer service" 96 in the welfare offices that the researchers visited. Citizens in need were "forced" to make more than two million trips a year to various welfare offices around the state. 97 To remedy this situation, one of the state's requirements for the new system they had in mind was to "reduce the number of mandatory visits to local offices" by "giving clients more avenues to interact with the agency" such as "the Internet, an automated and interactive phone system, and local organizations in the community." 98 There was also evidence that such visits were not only inefficient-wasting the time of Indiana citizensbut they led to corruption as well. 99 On the other hand, less face-to-face time freed up caseworkers to do other things as well. As The question of whether to outsource these modernizing tasks to a private provider was never aired publicly. Whether new technologies could, in effect, be insourced to the government rather than contracted out to the private sector was a question that could have benefitted from public discussion before the decision to outsource was made. Nor was the question of whether these types of reforms were worth pursuing, given the complexity and diverse nature of the makeup of the welfare applicant pool. The question of under what contractual terms the outsourcing project should proceed, however, was subject to additional consideration and public consultation of a sort. Before the contract to outsource welfare eligibility to IBM was signed, the governor appointed an Interagency Review Committee chaired by his own chief of staff and consisting of the heads of six state agencies. 101 The committee worked for seven months and made further modifications before approving the overall concept and design of the system as outlined in that contract. 102 The changes were based on the experiences of other states and the committee's analysis of what it thought some of the risks might be. 103 There were, however, no public hearings on the contract terms ultimately crafted by this committee. The public representative character of this committee consisted of the fact that the members were all a part of the government, appointed by the governor, and serving as heads of their respective administrative agencies. The representation on this committee could have been considerably broader and included actual welfare recipients or their public interest advocates. 104 As I shall argue below in part III, a more inclusive process should be institutionalized when future outsourcing occurs, especially when it involves potentially vulnerable populations such as welfare recipients.
As noted above, perhaps the most important goal of the state's reforms was to move away from face-to-face meetings and a fully government-run, caseworker-based system. In addition to being more efficient by lessening trips to a welfare office, the review committee found that "[t]he proposed eligibility system would lessen fraud and abuse by limiting the opportunities a client has to collude with a caseworker because caseworkers would no longer control cases from opening to close." 105 Every time a welfare recipient consulted the company involved, they would get a different person responding to their questions. The system had become largely decentralized in that sense. Governor Daniels also directed the Review Committee to ensure that the state employees who were let go and went to work for the selected vendor receive the same or better base salary and comparable benefits to state employees. 106 This had the effect of reducing the state's workforce and its employee budget as well. 107 In addition, the committee noted Indiana's policy initiative aimed to promote the development of policies and procedures that underscored the importance of work, accuracy, and caseload integrity across all areas of public assistance and that the governor had "specifically asked the Review Committee to assess whether the path to modernization would help welfare recipients become economically self-sufficient." 108 Presumably, this was an attempt to encourage work whenever possible over the benefits being provided, in accord with the thrust of the 1996 federal act. Another failing of Indiana before this plan was put into effect was that it ranked 50th among the states in the number of welfare recipients that were moved from welfare to work. 109 The review committee identified several areas of risk in implementing this new system. Modernization of this kind, it noted, had proven to be a significant challenge, as no state had successfully undertaken the task before. 110 They were aware that both Texas 111 and 106. Id. Despite the comparable benefits, there is evidence that there were issues related to the change in employment for many former state employees. A report issued by the United States Department of Agriculture noted the following:
Many state employees became ACS employees, which resulted in stressful relationships between individuals who were no longer colleagues. The tension is compounded by different employers being co-located in a single office, each with its own personnel policies (e.g., mandatory overtime and dress code). In addition, many people were fearful that they were going to lose their jobs. 115 Not only would the companies begin processing claims, they would drastically change the means by which claims were received, analyzed, and approved. The initial press release suggested the scope of the changes involved:
U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., FOOD & NUTRITION SERV., OFFICE OF RESEARCH & ANALYSIS, ENHANCING SUPPLEMENTAL NUTRITION ASSISTANCE PROGRAM (SNAP) CERTIFICATION
[t]he plan envisions improving delivery of the public safety-net benefits system received by one in six Hoosiers, by making it easier to apply through the Internet and telephone call centers. It also aims to use computers to drive the process with self surveys, instead of time-consuming interviews, to ease case workers' paperwork and reduce error and fraud. 116 The governor was unequivocal in stating the benefits of the new deal:
For taxpayers, a billion dollars of savings . . . For recipients, better service and a better chance to escape welfare for the world of work and self-reliance. For employees, better compensation and career prospects. For the Indiana economy, 1,000 new quality jobs. No decision we've made is more clearly in the public interest. 117 The state would save money through the consortium's automated system for welfare claims by reducing the amount of paperwork and reliance on in-person counseling-thereby reducing the requisite manpower. 118 That said, each of Indiana's ninety-two counties would "retain an office where people could apply in person for benefits, and all final eligibility determinations would be made by state employees." 119 Nevertheless, the staff in these offices could now be significantly reduced.
B. The Contract
The goals of corporate centralization and state based cost-savings were embodied in the contract (Master Services Agreement or MSA) Indiana entered into with IBM, a contract that sought to "transform and modernize the process by which information needed or related to making eligibility determinations is collected, organized, and managed." The overarching policy objectives of the Modernization Project and the Agreement were (i) to provide efficient, accurate and timely eligibility determinations for individuals and families who qualify for public assistance, (ii) to improve the availability, quality and reliability of the services being provided to Clients by expanding access to such services, decreasing inconvenience and improving response times, among other improvements, (iii) to assist and support Clients through programs that foster personal responsibility, independence and social and economic self-sufficiency, (iv) to assure compliance with all relevant Laws, (v) to assure the protection and integrity of Personal Information gathered in connection with eligibility determination, and (vi) to foster the development of policies and procedures that underscore the importance of accuracy in eligibility determinations, caseload integrity across all areas of public assistance and work and work-related experience for Clients in the Programs. 120 IBM would determine eligibility for Food Stamps, Medicaid, and Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF). 121 A memorandum of understanding executed with the MSA also emphasized the importance of economic development activities that were "part consideration" for the MSA. 122 The Governor observed that the economic benefits they anticipated were of "enormous importance to the Indiana economy," and his announcement would have been "just as big" if the Project involved those efforts alone. 123 stages of the plan. 125 The first phase of the plan was to be implemented in the state's northern counties and gradually introduced to the others. 126 The MSA provided that the modernized system would be rolled out in stages. 127 Initially, IBM would assist in processing social services applications under the existing system. 128 Next, the modernization system would be implemented on a region-by-region basis. 129 After this transition period, the project would reach a "steady state" once implemented in all counties. 130 The MSA established that the state retained all policy-making authority over the project as well as sole authority to make, and sole responsibility for, all eligibility determinations. 131 The MSA incorporated Key Performance Indicators (KPIs), which if the IBM Coalition failed to meet, would be liable for liquidated damages. 132 These KPIs required that 99 percent of food stamp cases, Medicaid case actions, Medicaid Disability applications, and TANF case actions be fully processed and transferred to the state no later than three business days prior to the established Federal and State Timelines. 133 Liquidated damages of $5,000 were owed per month in which these KPIs were not met, beginning in September 2008. 134 Other KPIs included that call response time should have a mean of 120 seconds or less and hold times for phone calls to the call center should have a mean less than three minutes. 135 The plan did not receive universal support. There was some political push back from the very start. Then Indiana House Speaker Patrick Bauer claimed that the "Daniels administration was allowing private companies to 'profit from the poor.'" 136 He and fellow Democrats warned of the possible deprivation of due process rights should regulators lose oversight of the companies. 137 As noted above, Indiana procured its contract with IBM by means of the statutory authority delegated to the Indiana Department of Administration to enter into contractual service agreements. See supra notes 88-93 and accompanying text. The Texas executive branch, on the other hand, worked more directly with the legislature, gaining promised to hold legislative hearings on the agreement, Governor Daniels nevertheless moved ahead with the contract, suggesting that "he did not need legislative approval to move forward . . . and that many state government services have been outsourced under previous administrations." 138 He was right. The contract procurement process proceeded like any other government contract for services: the Indiana Department of Administration, acting on behalf of FSSA, issued a request for proposal, negotiated with IBM, and eventually carried the procurement process to completion. 139 This was a public-private undertaking. The state, theoretically at least, retained all policy-making authority over the modernization project. And it had a direct operational role in the modernization project itself. It also retained sole authority to make and the sole responsibility for all eligibility determinations, should it decide to use them. 140 This arrangement was also recognized as experimental in nature and a project with considerable challenges to overcome. The experiences in Texas and Florida were not encouraging and the very nature of the undertaking was extremely difficult. 141 The programs falling within the project were complex and the processing and approval of applications for benefits for these programs were highly individualized determinations based on unique facts and circumstances. 142 IBM's performance indicators, however, were pragmatic: 143 calls answered, speed at which they were dealt with, accuracy of the determinations, and the like. But assumptions were made about the "welfare customers" that really did not fit the characteristics of the population to be served. The digital divide seemed never to come up in the planning or the implementation of this new system. Many if not most welfare recipients were not likely explicit legislative approval to privatize limited portions of the welfare system in 2003 and explicit approval to proceed with modernization under the watch of a legislative oversight committee in 2007. See supra note 83. Neither Indiana nor Texas proceeded without the delegated authority of the legislature, but in hindsight, Texas did enjoy the benefit of moving forward in an environment of greater political consensus than Indiana.
138. to be familiar with or even have access to computer technology. And even access to telephones was not always possible depending upon the condition of the applicant. 144 But quite apart from the access issues involving telephones and computers, the population of potential beneficiaries clearly could benefit from a face-to-face encounter, particularly where benefits might turn on their ability to work or not work. Objective criteria such as age, education, and willingness to work are given their real meaning when a caseworker can see the applicant. Such seemingly objective criteria do not stand up to actually observing an applicant's physical well-being to determine what they can and cannot realistically do. 145 Issues such as these were raised in the early days of welfare programs and formed the basis of a due process right to a hearing for those about to lose their benefits in the famous case of Goldberg v. Kelly. 146 It may be that there is less need for elaborate adjudicatory proceedings to sort out the issues involved in most cases, but the ability to see the applicant adds enormously to the ability of a caseworker to make the correct decision and provides a modicum of dignity to the applicant, especially if they are ultimately rejected. 147 Moreover, the applicant is likely to have a number of questions that he or she may not be able to articulate fully without help from the caseworker. Presumably the telephone might be a substitute for such a conversation, but the impersonal nature of the call coupled with the fact that the person on the other end of the line is not likely to be, and specifically is not intended to be, the same person with whom this applicant may have spoken to before. 148 These limitations-access to computers, timely access to telephones, and the ability to actually see the condition of the applicant-were arguably foreseeable challenges, but no one could have predicted the "perfect storm" that awaited the roll-out of this new approach to welfare. The Great Recession hit in 2008, with the number of claims for assistance growing enormously: benefit applications rose 21 percent and unemployment in 148. See Int'l Bus. Machs. Corp., No. 49D10-1005-PL-021451, slip op. at 7-8 ("Rather than be assigned to a single caseworker, clients would be able to contact and work with a variety of people in multiple settings.'") (internal quotation marks omitted); Perdue v. Murphy, 915 N.E.2d 498, 501 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009) ("While it is mathematically possible, it is unlikely that a client calling about his or her case would speak to the same employee each time.").
Indiana skyrocketed to 10.6 percent. 149 Congress' stimulus plan designed to deal with this downturn increased the amount of benefits to food stamp recipients, which resulted in a huge increase in workload for IBM and its subcontractors. 150 There were also a number of natural disasters that befell Indiana at that time, including the 2008 floods. 151 All of this increased the number of applicants asking for benefits that far outstripped what the original contract anticipated. 152 This is not to say that a purely governmental system would not also have been inundated by the increase in claims, but the enormous increase in demand and the fact it was unanticipated highlights a dilemma involved when a customer service contract model is in play. The government had purchased only a certain amount of service and one of the motivations for outsourcing to private providers was to save money-not spend more. Budget constraints would affect government providers too, but here the mindset could arguably be different. There was a public interest aspect to the crisis that could have justified moving funds for one governmental project to another so as to temporarily, at least, shore up welfare offices that were besieged. Under a contract, however, a product was being sold and that product was, in reality, a certain number of application reviews and decisions. It could not be infinitely expandable. The private provider's profits would be adversely affected if the demands greatly exceeded what the original contract was set up to do. Profits would be lessened if the number of applications far outpaced the numbers of employees hired to deal with these tasks. 153 In theory, at least, and especially in emergency situations, the state might have more flexibility when it comes to adding additional manpower on a short-term basis than the private sector and the limits of the contracts involved. 153. This inflexibility and its possible effect on the profit margins of private contractors was also seen in Pennsylvania, which outsourced the management of some of its halfway houses-transitional residences for inmates on parole. The researcher who oversaw a study of the halfway houses' effectiveness on former-inmates' recidivism rates noted that the focus of the halfway houses "had been on filling up beds . . . 154. See Michaels, supra note 51, at 631-40 (discussing the limits of the private sector in providing public services). Professor Jon Michaels argues that corporations are structured to act efficiently in order to maximize profits, which can create incentives to When the state decided to outsource welfare administration to a consortium of companies, headed by IBM and ACS, these companies were hired, in large part, to modernize the infrastructure used in the processing welfare applications, with special attention given to reducing the need for in-person counseling. The expectation was that human error and corruption would decrease as a result of the move to the automated system. Yet, in October of 2009, only three years into the contract, Governor Daniels surprised many by cancelling the contract with IBM, moving instead to a hybrid system and placing ACS at the helm of the new project. 155 In the months following, the state and IBM litigated the decision to cancel, the state's ability to seize assets used by the IBM group, and the alleged underperformance by IBM. 156 These issues are still being litigated today.
C. Implementation and Cancelation of the Contract
The IBM group began to assume control over the administration of Indiana welfare claims in 2007. 157 Despite gradually implementing the program across the state to reduce strain on the new system, it started off poorly even before the floods and economic meltdown occurred. 158 Both IBM and ACS saw implementation problems from the start. An IBM employee complained that ACS was understaffed, while an ACS employee claimed that there were multiple applications not in queue and duplicate scans of other applications appearing over and over again. 159 In a 2007 e-mail, FSSA secretary Mitch Roob described persistent problems such as thousands of lost work hours and tens of thousands of unanswered calls. 160 Welfare recipients suffered as a result from these complications during the implementation of this modernization program. and other of our most vulnerable citizens have endured monstrous challenges to address their basic health care, nutritional and other daily necessities." 161 In one such instance, an eighty-year-old woman's Medicaid benefits were erroneously cut off. Her benefits were denied because she failed to call into an eligibility hotline on a day because she was hospitalized for congestive heart failure. 162 She was one of thousands of Indiana residents to have their benefits, such as Medicaid and food stamps, suddenly and erroneously cut off. 163 In 2009, Stacie Kelly was twenty-seven weeks pregnant and did not have health insurance. In order to see a doctor, she applied for Medicaid but did not receive any response for two months despite calling her caseworker and leaving numerous messages. 164 Brittany Anderson, who suffers from a seizure disorder, was told by FSSA that she would have to reapply for Medicaid benefits in March of 2008. 165 When her friend, Melissa Gibson, learned of the potential termination, she called IBM several times to inquire about Brittany's continued receipt of Medicaid benefits and received conflicting responses from IBM representatives and no assistance. When Melissa attempted to reapply for Medicaid benefits on behalf of Brittany, an IBM employee told her that an application for Brittany had already been received and a new one would not be accepted or processed. For the next eight months, whenever Melissa would call to check on the status of her friend's case, she was always told that the case was "pending." Although Brittany and Melissa had signed releases allowing IBM access to Brittany's medical records, IBM never contacted her medical providers. When Brittany was without health coverage, a medical device surgically implanted in her chest failed and she was unable to afford corrective surgery. As a result, her health deteriorated after enduring numerous seizures, and she was eventually forced to withdraw from high school. It was only after Governor Daniels terminated the MSA and Brittany's struggle was featured on local news that the FSSA reinstated her Medicaid benefits. 166 Meanwhile, reports published by the state in 2008 and 2009 regarding the performance of the modernization initiative seemed to indicate nothing but success in terms of the aggregate numbers involved. 167 In May 2008, Roob reported that "we are serving more people statewide and in a timelier manner than we ever have before." 168 In 2009 it was reported that the agency was processing applications for Medicaid, food stamps, and TANF benefits just as quickly as it was before. 169 Allegations, however, then surfaced that IBM and ACS workers prescreened applicants before state officials could determine whether welfare benefits should have been given. As a 2011 Los Angeles Times article stated, "documents were lost, [and when] cases piled up . . . workers started routinely denying applications just to reduce the backlog." 170 Dozens of cases were filed in court alleging deprivation of due process rights and negligence against the state and IBM. 171 Many more complained to the FSSA and sought administrative remedies, 172 only to find litigation the only means of recourse. 173 FSSA officials suggested that they recognized the problems early in the project, but "yielded to the company's wishes to expand the project" to the remaining counties, thus qualifying for a greater payout from the state. 174 The expansion left the consortium exposed to the risks of upswings in the number of claims, which is exactly what happened with the 2007 floods and the 2008 financial recession.
Both the state and IBM were proactive in trying to adjust the modernization plan to respond to the problems they encountered. The contract was amended eleven times over the course of the project, which added $178 million to the total cost, 175 and both parties conducted their own extensive assessments of the project. 176 Beyond contract amendments, IBM and the state made other adjustments along the way. In November 2008, IBM met with FSSA to propose seventeen systemic changes to adjust to the external problems it was facing, and the state was able to implement many of these reforms. 177 But in early 2009, after the state began working on these reforms, it sent a letter to the IBM Coalition outlining thirty-six issues that needed to be addressed. 178 Many of these issues were identical to reforms previously approved at the end of 2008. 179 Notably, the letter outlined twenty-one issues that were unrelated to existing performance standards under the MSA and six more that were not yet in effect. 180 At the same time, IBM also did an "end-to-end assessment" which contained several recommendations for improvement, but nonetheless concluded that "any problems on the Project were 'eminently fixable' and that the concept of modernization was sound." 181 In July 2009, the parties agreed on a "Corrective Action Plan," which included both long-and short-term initiatives to address the issues that had been raised in the state's letter and IBM's end-to-end assessment. 182 adjustments seemed to reflect good-faith efforts by both parties to work together to improve the project. But eventually, the state realized that adjustments were not enough; an entirely new approach was needed. Just two months after signing the Corrective Action Plan, the state decided to move to a modified approach, "Plan B," which abandoned the centralized call center, decentralized eligibility case management, and utilized face-to-face interactions with FSSA staff. 183 But rather than directly approach IBM about modifying the original plans for complete modernization, the state approached long-time state welfare officials to come up with a different approach. 184 The main concern was that the original plan had used too much technology, too quickly. 185 With a new approach in hand, the state then decided to pursue IBM about changing course. 186 Governor Daniels announced that the decision had nothing to do with the performance of IBM and it appears that the state hoped that IBM would implement the hybrid plan. 187 IBM initially expressed willingness to move forward with Plan B, but eventually concluded that it could not implement the hybrid system without an increase in the contract price that the state could not afford due to budget cuts. 188 Finally, in October 2009, Governor Daniels, spurred on by increasing pressure from public interest groups, 189 state Democrats, 190 and the Federal Department of Agriculture, 191 canceled the contract with IBM, 192 despite noting that "[t]he fraud appears to have been stopped and we're still on track to save taxpayers hundreds of millions of dollars" through the new, hybrid system. 193 The governor conceded that "the intended service improvements have not been delivered, and that's not acceptable." 194 In its place, the governor tapped ACS to oversee a hybrid system that would incorporate successful elements of the old welfare system and what is known as the modernized system. 195 In short, Governor Daniels canceled the contract for a lack of progress made by IBM, and he criticized the program for two primary reasons: "[t]he system tried to remove the burden of required face-to-face meetings and it used a task-based approach rather than a case-based approach to process applications." 196 In addition to removing IBM from the Project, the government seized "more than $9 million worth of [IBM's] computers, servers and office furniture" that the company used while in charge. 197 In response, IBM called the cancelation "unjustified" and added that "[o]ur efforts have significantly improved the Indiana welfare system to the benefit of recipients and all of the state." 198 The company noted that it was making sufficient progress-contrary to Governor Daniel's claim-but that "high unemployment led to more demands on the welfare system, making the changes more difficult." 199 IBM asserted breach of contract among other claims. It also filed a separate suit against the state, and its claims were consolidated with the state's originally-filed complaint. 200 In the opening lines of the court opinion, Judge Dreyer of the Marion Superior Court stated that "[n]either party deserves to win this case. This story represents a 'perfect storm' of misguided government policy and overzealous corporate ambition. Overall, both parties are to 194 ). In the midst of discovery, the sides produced lists of requested deponents and in-court witnesses; on IBM's list was Governor Mitch Daniels. The state moved to prevent the Governor's testimony, citing Indiana Code section 34-29-2-1-providing the Governor of the state of Indiana is "privileged from arrest on civil process, and from obeying any subpoena to testify." Id. IBM claimed that Daniels's testimony was relevant and central to its claim. The trial court granted IBM's motion, with limitations and the state requested an interlocutory appeal on the issue. blame and Indiana's taxpayers are left as apparent losers." 201 The court found that Indiana had failed to prove that IBM breached its contract, and awarded no damages to the state. The court ordered the state to pay a total of $52 million plus interest and fees to IBM, $40 million from a previous order, plus a new $12 million judgment which predominately covers equipment kept by the state. 202 Despite these complications and legal woes, Governor Daniels proclaimed that cancelling the contract had been the right action because "now [Indiana] has its most timely, most accurate, most cost effective and fraud free system." 203 This, he stated, was always the goal and severing ties with IBM was necessary to achieve it. 204 
III. LESSONS LEARNED: RE-EMBEDDING MARKET APPROACHES INTO SOCIETY
At this juncture, we may make several observations about the case just presented. First, Indiana's process of renewing the search for a hybrid approach in some ways confirms the double movement effect predicted by Polanyi, mainly in the disembedding story and its reversal through the political process. 205 At the same time, Polanyi might not have anticipated that the key actor in the re-embedding process was the Governor, prompted and supported by the legislature. Second, as the limits of a marketized approach became apparent, political pressures to rectify the situation grew, but this did not mean returning to the old regime. Third, re-embedding introduced new requirements-specifically to preserve the conditions' flexibility and innovation associated with the private sector, while also fulfilling the rights of welfare recipients in ways associated with the public sector. I develop these observations further below. What can we learn from this process? Specifically, what role might law play to ensure the optimum conditions of an effective double movement? thirty days prior entering the agreement. 209 And although the statute gives the state budget committee the opportunity to make a recommendation concerning the contract thirty days before its enacted, the statute does not require a recommendation. 210 The statute aims more at making the procurement process more transparent rather than creating a substantial hurdle to that process. Moreover, because the opportunity for a public hearing takes place later in the process, there is no opportunity for a public discussion of whether the state should consider privatizing government service in the first place.
There are many reasons why a more elaborate contracting review process is necessary when the duties being outsourced involve welfare. The human dimensions of the product being contracted for are far more complex than the brick and mortar nature of a bridge or a road. Moreover, bidding processes set forth in procurement statutes are concerned primarily with eliminating corruption of a certain kindwhere favoritism is shown to political supporters or the like. 211 This kind of corruption, as we have seen, was a factor motivating Indiana's welfare reforms, among others, but it is not truly central to the kind of process needed to craft a new welfare benefits delivery system that 209. IND. CODE § 4-12-13-2(b)(1) (2012). The statute also requires this process if the state wants to have state employees directly provide government services that had formerly been provided by a private vendor-essentially, this changes state policy by moving away from privatized services and reinstating government employees. IND. CODE § 4-12-13-3(a) (2012). However, the statute allows for an agency director to expedite this process if he or she declares "that an emergency exists that requires the employees of the state agency to directly provide the services that were provided by a private contractor or private vendor." IND. CODE § 4-12-13-3(b) (2012 achieves its substantive goals, including delivering benefits to the needy. To this end, what is essential is the participation of a wide range of stakeholders and citizens, including the most obvious of the stakeholders involved, the welfare applicants themselves.
More importantly, the state itself has interests broader than just lowering the cost of welfare administration when it makes contracts such as these-it also has responsibility for the actual welfare of the applicants involved. The state is the true client in this bargain and it must be sure to write a contract comprehensive enough to ensure these responsibilities are appropriately delegated to the private provider involved so that it can be responsive, not only to taxpayers in general, but to welfare applicants and recipients in particular. The scope of this statutory reform should be expanded. The basic decision to outsource a governmental program is, in and of itself, a significant one and procedural opportunities to question the wisdom of that basic decision should also be provided in a timely way, quite apart from an analysis of the details of the actual outsourcing contract involved. The Indiana statute authorizing a hearing thirty days prior to enactment is a good start at re-embedding markets into the state, but the law should provide for comment much earlier than thirty days before implementation. More specifically, it should enable a discussion of what should be done privately and what should be done in-house before that basic decision becomes a fait accompli.
In addition to holding a public hearing and soliciting a recommendation from the state budget committee, the contract should also be published on a government website 212 before enactment so that affected stakeholders and their public interest representatives can comment on its specific provisions. 213 In the Indiana case, there would undoubtedly have been even more significant feedback on the computer literacy of the potential beneficiaries that made up most of the potential welfare recipients, as well as the counter arguments for retaining a substantial face-to-face component of the welfare processes then in place. In fact, the state actually sought such feedback informally while it was implementing its hybrid plan. FSSA issued a press release 212. The Internet did play a major role in the informal response and criticism of the IBM contract. See Mannix, LaCheen, Freedman & Cohan, supra note 141, at 9-10. Several websites were created that allowed individuals adversely affected by the modernization project to log their complaints and stories. seeking comments and recommendations from anyone familiar with the old casework system. 214 This should now be institutionalized more formally in a notice and comment statutory provision.
Such an expanded contracting approach would produce a better contract that increases participation and feedback for decision makers. The agency involved would have a better and more timely sense of what might work and what might fail. At the same time, knowledge of the contract involved would give potential beneficiaries of these reforms an opportunity to suggest alternative ways of achieving a more efficient system that effectively carries out its substantive goals.
B. Third-Party Beneficiaries
Quite apart from the processes utilized to create these contracts and the opportunities they provide for various stakeholders, especially potential and actual welfare recipients, to participate, welfare recipients should be treated as third-party beneficiaries of the contract being formulated. What the Indiana case shows in stark relief is that the state was the client in this contract. Further, at least at the outset, access to welfare (and therefore welfare recipients themselves) represented the product for which the state contracted. However, the complexities of this arrangement, including the important differences that existed among the types and needs of the welfare recipients involved, ultimately required more complex processes to determine eligibility, processes that combined new technologies with face-to-face contact as well. It did not make sense to assume certain uniform levels of computer literacy or even access to call centers.
Though welfare applicants and recipients were at times referred to as clients, their rights were represented exclusively by the state. The essence of the Polanyi double movement is that the impetus for re-embedding the state into the market is most likely to come from those most affected-the potential welfare recipients themselves. To this end, providing them with an opportunity for judicial review makes the double movement even more likely to occur. Contracts between private companies and states could recognize welfare recipients as third-party beneficiaries to the contract to allow recipients legal redress when private contractors violate the terms of the contract in a way that results in the unlawful deprivation of benefits. 215 Indiana law recognizes third-party beneficiaries when (1) the parties to the contract intend to benefit a third party, (2) the contract imposes a duty on one of the parties in favor of the third party, and (3) the performance of the terms of the contract directly benefits the third party. 216 However, courts will not interpret a contract so as to render any clauses, phrases, or words in a contract meaningless. Therefore, contracts that include "no third-beneficiary clauses" unambiguously state the parties' intent to not create third-party beneficiaries. 217 The MSA discussed above had such a clause. 218 The Indiana legislature could therefore enact legislation that would make the state's agreement to such a clause in a contract with vendors for the privatization of government services a violation of public policy. Moreover, the legislature could also require language in the contract explicitly making welfare recipients third-party beneficiaries.
It is ironic that the only party that was able to challenge IBM's performance was the state. Given the diverse interests at stake and the state's desire to have its contract work as efficiently as possible, it might not be as willing to challenge the contractor as those whose benefits are very much on the line. At a minimum, making the proposed contract more available publicly before it is signed would enable potential welfare recipients to determine whether a third-party beneficiary clause in fact exists in the contract, giving them the chance to advocate for this means of holding IBM accountable to its promises.
Shortly after he was elected in 2004, Governor Daniels issued an executive order requiring that the Department of Administration log and summarize, on the Internet, "the significant terms and conditions and other key elements of all written contracts to which the State becomes a party." 225 This online index is searchable and free of charge to the public. 226 This index does not include agreements between government contractors and subcontractors, and the Indiana APRA 227 does not explicitly mandate public disclosure of subcontracts. But it does not explicitly exempt them either. 228 Moreover, in the MSA between IBM and the state, the parties agreed that all information in the possession of the state was subject to an APRA request unless the contractor had formally designated the information "confidential." 229 The fact that the state negotiated this kind of language suggests that it understands the APRA to mean that agreements between contractors and subcontractors in possession of the state would be subject to an APRA request as long as the vendor did not formally designate them as "confidential." 230 Indiana could, nevertheless, be more explicit about the right of welfare recipients and other interested parties to request information from the state concerning privatization efforts.
CONCLUSION
Polanyi's analysis of double movement is useful for considering the limits of the market in relation to specific substantive programs. In the welfare case study presented above, the government ultimately remained in control of the programs involved, but it sought to substitute private providers where it had formerly administered programs through a diverse concatenation of state and county offices. In the context of welfare, then, states became clients as new best business practices substituted for traditional government case work. In Polanyi's terms we can assess the extent to which marketization of the administration of welfare disembeds the market from the state only to return key services to the state after a perceived failure of the contract on the part of the private provider. The example suggests we may look forward to new relationships between public and private entities that in turn suggest new uses of law and the need for new law reforms.
Understanding how different conceptions of globalization yield different approaches to providing for and conceptualizing social services-analyzing, in other words, some of the domestic faces of globalization-gives us a chance to think practically and conceptually about the law's role, especially if law is to be a means by which we can rethink the relationship of economy and society for vulnerable populations. Indiana's efforts to modernize welfare were initially consistent with an ideological version of neoliberalism that relied heavily on markets as substitutes for traditional governmental provision of services. Yet the double movement predicted by Polanyi occurred. The political process pushed back and the complaints of many potential and actual welfare recipients ultimately seemed to register. Faced with challenges, the strict binary choice between government and the market inherent in that ideology gave way to a more hybrid (and more realistic) approach-a new mix of market streamlining and face-to-face encounters with welfare recipients. New relationships between private providers of services, the government and the potential beneficiaries of this public-private partnership, were formed, even as the limits of the marketization of welfare administration in Indiana were reached. Those limits included a misreading of the needs of welfare recipients as if they were like any set of potential customers. The new system that emerged out of the lawsuit leaves more room for judgment and discretion. A binary approach (dividing best business practices from government) simply could not provide the basis for resolving the toughest issues. Indeed, when the numbers of welfare claims rose dramatically due to floods and an economic crisis, IBM could not simply add more people to its payroll and efficiently absorb all of these new costs. There were limits to what a for-profit corporation was able to do to carry out a contract at a certain cost. 231 Its stockholders implicitly imposed those limits. After the contract dispute and the breach of contract suit, a hybrid approach emerged-hybrid, not only in the methodology for assessing eligibility claims, but hybrid also in the sense that it was now recognized that private corporate efficiency alone 231. See supra text accompanying note 175 (noting the fact that changes to the MSA resulted in $178 million in additional cost for the state).
could not absorb the additional costs of the economic and natural crises that took place. 232 When market approaches are proposed for the administration of social services and applied to vulnerable populations that by definition usually lack significant political power, law should provide the means for keeping markets connected to the state. Allowing for greater public participation in the contracting process and providing the information necessary to make such participation effective would be an important reform. As Polanyi argued, there has never been a self-regulating market, but this does not mean the idea of self-regulation is unimportant or without high stakes. 233 Law is necessary not only to ensure that property rights exist and contracts are enforced, but it is also necessary to connect the market and the state in ways that increase efficiency without undermining what should be the main goal of any welfare program: the actual welfare of the people it is meant to serve.
232. See supra text accompanying note 214 (noting the fact that IBM was ultimately unable to implement the "Plan B" hybrid approach because the state could not afford to pay the additional costs that such a switch would require).
233. See Joseph E. Stiglitz, Foreword to POLANYI, supra note 3, at xiii.
